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Gambling with Terrorism and U.S. Military
Readiness: Time to Ban Video Gambling
Devices on U.S. Military Bases and
Facilities?
JOHN WARREN KINDT*

I.
A.

INTRODUCTION

GAMBLING WITH U.S. "MILITARY READINESS"

This analysis focuses first on a salient military issue: "Is U.S. military
readiness being gambled away in the Twenty-First Century's Age of
Terrorism?" In analyzing this question a second issue arises regarding the
potential bias of informational sources that are closely associated with the
gambling industry and its financial leverage. Accordingly, there will be a
review of concerns involving some informational sources on gambling
issues which have been criticized in the national press as perhaps being too
closely associated with the gambling industry and its financial leverage.
One conclusion of this analysis is that because the costs outweigh the
minimal benefits, the entire U.S. Armed Forces should reinstate the ban on
video gambling devices (VGDs) on U.S. bases and other facilities-which
was the intermittent policy of the U.S. Armed Forces throughout most of
the Twentieth Century. A second recommendation is from the Columbia
Journalism Review' which suggests that military analysts and researchers
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I.

Stephen J. Simurda, When Gambling Comes To Town: How to Cover a High-

Stakes Story, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan./Feb. 1994, at 36-38 [hereinafter COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV.].
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should "follow the money', 2 and "flat out ask ' 3 all sources of gambling
information if those sources have ever received direct or indirect financial
assistance from pro-gambling interests.4
B.

GAMBLING WITH TERRORISM

The comments of academics' defending the rapid expansion of the
U.S. gambling industry during the first years of the Twenty-First Century,
as well as the 1990s, must be viewed in the context of the combined impact
U.S. gambling has had on strategic U.S. political, economic, and defense
policies. 6 To stimulate the U.S. economy after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on
the World Trade Center, the 2002 Economic Stimulus Bill 7 was designed to
include major tax and economic incentives worth approximately $70 billion
to $100 billion to the U.S. consumer economy. 8

2. Id.
3. Id. at 37-38.
4.
Id. See also John W. Kindt, U.S. National Security and the Strategic Economic
Base: The Business/Economic Impacts of the Legalization of Gambling Activities, 39
ST. Louis U.L.J. 567 (1995) [hereinafter Strategic Economic Base], reprinted in National
Gambling Impact & Policy Comm 'n Act: Hearing on H.R. 497 Before the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 528-45 (1995) [hereinafter Congressional Gambling Hearing
1995].
5.
See, e.g., John Gonzalez, Casino Backers are Studying Their Cards,FT. WORTH
STAR TELEGRAM, Feb. 15, 1995, at 28; George Kuempel, Senator Says He Has Votes to
Block Casino, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 15, 1995, at Al6. See also Letter from
William Bryan, Associate Dean of Research, Editor, Illinois Business Review, to William
Eadington, Professor, University of Nevada at Reno (Feb. 15, 1995) (on file with the
author). Subsequent to his editorship, William Bryan became Dean of the Loyola
University School of Business, and in 2000 he became Dean of the University of Illinois
College of Commerce and Business Administration. For examples of unbalanced criticisms
by William Eadington, see William Eadington, Comment, 23 MANAGERIAL & DECISION
ECON. (2003) (forthcoming) [hereinafter Eadington Comment].
6.
See generally, John W. Kindt & Anne E. C. Brynn, Destructive Economic
Policies in the Age of Terrorism: Government-Sanctioned Gambling As Encouraging
TransboundaryEconomic Raiding and DestabilizingNationaland InternationalEconomies,
16 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 243 (2002) [hereinafter Gambling's Destabilizing
Economies].
7.
Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116
Stat. 21 (2002).
8. Richard S. Dunham, Just When The Right Thought Big Government Was History,
Bus. WK., Nov. 5, 2001, at 53; see Jim Drinkard, House Oks $100B For Economy:
Stimulus Bill's Tax Breaks Face Fight in the Senate, USA TODAY, Oct. 25, 2001, at A5;
John W. Kindt, Internationally, The 21st Century Is No Time for the United States to Be
Gambling With the Economy: Taxpayers Subsidizing the Gambling Industry and the De
Facto Elimination of All Casino Tax Revenues Via the 2002 Economic Stimulus Act, 29
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Corporate tax-cut requests in the Economic Stimulus Bill, which were
proposed for "product-oriented" companies, were chastised by the Wall
Street Journal and were largely rejected; such as $2.3 billion for Ford
ranging down to $9 million for Kroger. 9 However, by comparison, the
"nonproduct-oriented" gambling companies received a $40 billion tax gift
from the U.S. taxpayers.' 0 In 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives
Gaming Caucus maneuvered a provision into the Economic Stimulus
package for gambling interests to write-off $40 billion for slot machines
and associated electronic devices" '-a sector of the U.S. economy not only
creating no products, but also draining "consumer dollars" away from the
consumer economy. The leader of the Congressional Gambling Caucus
had originally requested tax write-offs (for slot machines) which the
Las Vegas press reported were worth approximately $133 billion., 2 This
latter amount was roughly comparable to one-half of the total regular
annual budget for the U.S. Department of Defense 3 or to approximately4
twice the $80 billion cost for the U.S. portion of the 2003 war with Iraq.1
As the Las Vegas press praised this $40 billion government payback to the
gambling industry, which equated to all of the taxes paid by the casino
industry for more than a decade, 5 serious concerns were raised about the

OHIO N.U. L. REV. 363 (2003) [hereinafter Gambling With the Economy and the
Elimination ofAll Casino Tax Revenues].
9.
Bruce Bartlett, Tax Rebates Won't Stimulate the Economy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1,
2001, at A20; John D. McKinnon & Shailagh Murray, Companies Could Reap Big Tax
Refunds from House Bill, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2001, at A28. See also Leslie Wayne, So,
Friend, It's Timefor That Tax Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, § 3, at 1.
10.
Tony Batt, Tax Break for Slots OK'd: Measure Will Let Companies Deduct
Technological Expenses, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Oct. 16, 2001 [hereinafter Tax Break
$40 Billion for Slots].

I1. Id.
12.
Id.

13.
See U.S. Dep't Defense, Annual Budget (2001); H.R. Rep. No. 106-945, at3
et seq. (2000). See also OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DEP'T DEFENSE,
NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR FY 2002, at Tbl. I- I (Aug. 2001), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/fy2002budget/fyO2grbk.pdf; U.S. Dep't Defense, News
Release: Department of Defense Amended Budget for FY 2001 (June 27, 2001), available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun200I/b0627200 I_bt287-0 I.html.
14.

See, e.g., Senate OKs $80 Billion War Package, NEWS-GAZETTE (Champaign,

IL), Apr. 12, 2003, at A3.
15.
Compare, Tax Break $40 Billion for Slots, supra note 10, with Eugene M.
Christiansen, Gaming Tax Rates Reach to the Sky as States Struggle, INT'L GAMING &
WAGERING BUS., Aug. 2003, at 32. (U.S. gambling industry trade magazine). See also
Gambling With the Economy and the Elimination of All Casino Tax Revenues, supra note 8;
John W. Kindt, Would Re-Criminalizing U.S. Gambling Pump-Prime the Economy and
Could U.S. Gambling Facilities Be Transformed into Educational and High-Tech
Facilities? Will the Legal Discovery of Gambling Companies' Secrets Confirm Research
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governmental decision-making process and the informational sources being
utilized by the gambling industry to promote its interests-such as two
well-used Arthur Andersen reports16 financed by the American Gaming
Association (AGA) lobbying group.17
An informed review of the research on gambling reveals that the
gambling industry has lost the factual debate on "costs" versus "benefits."
Although the pro-gambling interests had substantial influence on the 1999
National Gambling Impact Study Commission (NGISC or 1999 U.S.
Gambling Commission) and were excoriated in the national press for trying
to stack the Commission,' 8 the Commission's FinalReport 19 demonstrated
that the pro-gambling interests lost the cost/benefit debate. Accordingly,
the Commission unanimously called for a moratorium on the expansion of
U.S. legalized gambling activities.20
However, pro-gambling financed academics/experts had not
abandoned lauding the gambling industry. Furthermore, they began to
challenge estimates of the social costs created by gambling that they
initially had not questioned, 2' and the industry's strategy appeared to shift

Issues?, 8 STAN. J.L., Bus. & FIN. 169 (2003).
16.
Arthur Andersen, Economic Impacts of Casino Gaming In the United States:
Micro Study (May 1997) (prepared for the Am. Gaming Ass'n, lobbying group) [hereinafter
Am. Gaming Assoc./Andersen Micro Study]; Arthur Andersen, Economic Impacts of
Casino Gaming In the United States: Macro Study (Dec. 1996) (prepared for the Am.
Gaming Ass'n, lobbying group) [hereinafter Am. Gaming Assoc./Andersen Macro Study].
17.
id.
18.
See, e.g., Editorial, Gambling Payoff?, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1997, at A 18. See
also John W. Kindt, The Failure to Regulate the Gambling Industry Effectively: Incentives
for Perpetual Non-Compliance, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 219 (2003) [hereinafter Gambling's
Perpetual Non-Compliance].
19.
NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT (June 1999),
available at http:llgovinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/fullrpt.html [hereinafter NGISC
FINAL REPORT].

20.
Id. at introductory letter (Chair Kay C. James). For examples of analyses
calling for the re-criminalization of gambling activities, see John W. Kindt & Stephen W.
Joy, Internet Gambling and the Destabilization of National and International Economies:
Time for a Comprehensive Ban on Gambling Over the World Wide Web, 80 DENV. U. L.
REV. I11 (2002) [hereinafter Gambling's Destabilization of Economies]; Strategic
Economic Base, supra note 4.
21.
See, e.g., Liz Benston, Expert: Problem Gambling Study Flawed, LAS VEGAS
SUN, Mar. 31, 2003 at C I [hereinafter Gambling Flawed] (countering a 2003 study on the
social costs of gambling by Professor William Thompson, "the Nevada Resort Association
[led by former pro-gambling NGISC Commissioner William Bible]-the chief lobbying
group for Nevada casinos--commissioned a rebuttal report by Georgia College ... Assistant
Professor Douglas Walker"). See generally, The Gambling Impact Study Commission:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong., 156-57 (1995)
[hereinafter Congressional Hearing on Gambling Impact Commission].
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increasingly towards other methods such as attacking the credibility of the
academic community 22 and/or utilizing alleged intimidation tactics to
circumvent or repress First Amendment debate.23
Regardless, any
decisionmaker needs to "follow the money" and be 24alert to any
informational bias linked to pro-gambling financial interests.
II. DELIMITATION OF PROBLEMS

A.

GAMBLING WITH U.S. "MILITARY READINESS"

In the context of U.S. military readiness, the issues are first the type of
gambling and secondly whether that gambling impacts the military. In
2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) produced its Report on the Effect
of the Ready Availability of Slot Machines on Members of the Armed
Forces, Their Dependents, and Others25 (DOD 2001 Slots Report) which
concluded that 2 percent of U.S. military personnel had a gambling
problem, whereas the percentage for the general U.S. population was
between .77 and 1.6 percent.26 Although the DOD 2001 Slots Report was a
cursory thirteen-page report, it basically confirmed earlier DOD reports of
a pathological gambling problem of 2 percent among military personnel.
The 2001 report reiterated that the DOD's 199227 and 199828 reports
indicated that there was a gambling problem among U.S. military

22.
See, e.g., Gambling Flawed, supra note 21, at Cl; COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
supra note I, at 36-38.
23.
For an analysis of the First Amendment interface with the tobacco debate, see
Donald W. Garner, Fighting the Tobacco Wars on First Amendment Grounds, 27 Sw. U. L.
REV. 379 (1998) [hereinafter Wars on First Amendment]. See also Press Release of Frank
Fahrenkopf, CEO of Am. Gaming Assoc., Chicago, I11.(May 21, 1998) (although most of
the national press attended this press conference as concomitant to the hearings being
conducted by the National Gambling Impact Study Commission, Frank Fahrenkopf's
attacks on the academic community were ignored by all of the news media-except for the
Las Vegas press).
24.
See COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., supra note I, at 36-38 and accompanying text.
25.
SEC'Y DEF., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT ON THE EFFECT OF THE READY
AVAILABILITY OF SLOT MACHINES ON MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, THEIR DEPENDENTS,

AND OTHERS (2001) [hereinafter DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT].
26.
NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 4-6, tbl. 4-2.
27.
NAT'L TECH. INFORMATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., 1992 WORLDWIDE
SURVEY OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND HEALTH BEHAVIORS AMONG MILITARY PERSONNEL at
12-14 to 12-30 [hereinafter MILITARY PERSONNEL 1992 REPORT].
28.
ROBERT M. BRAY ET AL., 1998 DEP'T OF DEF. SURVEY OF HEALTH RELATED
BEHAVIORS AMONG MILITARY PERSONNEL [hereinafter DOD 1998 HEALTH AMONG
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personnel-particularly with regard to slot machines, electronic gambling
devices (EGDs), and video gambling devices (VGDs), which are
collectively referenced by sociologists as the "crack cocaine" of creating
new addicted gamblers-a nomenclature also recognized by the 1999 U.S.
Gambling Commission.2 9
During Congressional hearings in 2000, U.S. Representative Roscoe
Bartlett (R-Md.) questioned Alphonso Maldon, Assistant Defense
Secretary, "about the wisdom of operating slot machines in 'a military
where a number of our young families are on food stamps'., 30 During
1999, military personnel and civilian employees in the four Armed Services
lost $127 million in approximately 8,000 slot machines located in 94
overseas bases and other posts. 31 This scenario highlighted a historical
resurgence of slot machine gambling on overseas military bases.
In 1969, the Senate Government Operations Committee
subcommittee on investigations looked into improprieties
in the operation of slot machines and other recreational
activities at servicemen's clubs overseas. Two years later,
Army Secretary Robert F. Froehlke ordered the removal of
slot machines from every Army post and base, citing a
"corruptive influence." The Air Force joined the Army in
destroying thousands of machines; the Navy and Marines
kept theirs in place.32
The Congressional hearings in 2000 prompted the DOD 2001 Slots Report.
B.

THE FLOYD D. SPENCE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT

In the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Act, Public Law 106-398, 33
approved on October 30, 2000, the U.S. Secretary of Defense was required
to submit another report to Congress,

MILITARY].

29.

Laurence Arnold, Overseas Slot Machines Are Military's Billion-Dollar

Gamble, Jan. 13, 2001, at 1, available at http://lexis-nexis.com [hereinafter Slot Machines
Military's Gamble]. See also Viveca Novak, They Call It Video Crack, TIME, June I, 1998,

at 58 [hereinafter Video Crack]. See generally, NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at
5-5.
30.
Slot Machines Military's Gamble, supra note 29.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001,
Pub. L. No. 106-398. 114 Stat. 1654 (2000).
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evaluating the effect that the ready availability of slot
machines as a morale, welfare, and recreation activity on
United States military installations outside of the United
States has on members of the military, their dependents,
and other persons who use such slot machines, the morale
of military communities overseas, and the personal
financial stability of members of the Armed Forces.
The report was required to include an estimate of the number of
persons who used the slot machines over the preceding two years, giving a
percentage breakdown into the following groups: enlisted members,
officers, DOD civilians, other U.S. persons, and foreign nationals. The
law also required the Defense Department to give information on military
personnel showing the number (as a percentage and by pay grade) who had
"sought financial services counseling at least partially due to the use of
such slot machines;" or "qualified for Government financial assistance at
least partially due to the use of such slot machines;" or "had a personal
check returned for insufficient funds or received any other nonpayment
notification from a creditor at least partially due to the use of such slot
machines;" and also report the "average amount expended by each
category" of personnel.36
Representative Bartlett's concerns prompted provisions to require the
DOD 2001 Slots Report to analyze the impact of video gambling machines
and devices on military personnel.37 The research contract was won by
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 38 It was anticipated that an in-depth report would
be forthcoming, however,
[t]he firm's study was abruptly cancelled midway through

the process ... The Pentagon claimed that the consultants'

plans were not what Congress wanted, according to Lisa
Wright, Bartlett's press secretary . . . "The Pentagon

decided to do the study in-house," said Ms. Wright.
PricewaterhouseCoopers declined comment ... Not just

any section of the Pentagon took over the research. The

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at § 336(a).
Id. at § 336(b)(I).
Id. at §§ 336(b)(2)(A)-(C), (b)(3).

Maura Casey, Military Secrets: Gambling Problems Stay Hushed Up, THE DAY

(New London, Conn.), Mar. 17, 2002, at H 1, H4 [hereinafter Casey].
38.
Id.
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Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Department-the very
department that uses profits from slot machinesconducted the study, according to the Pentagon. The
thirteen-page
report was highly supportive of slot
39
machines.
Accordingly, it would be difficult to find agreement with any
suggestion that this cursory thirteen-page, conflict-of-interest report was
the final word on gambling addiction in the U.S. military-as was argued
by William Eadington of the University of Nevada at Reno.4 °
C.

DOD

2001 SLOTS REPORT ON THE EFFECT OF SLOT MACHINES

After reviewing the information available, and as Mr. Eadington
highlighted, it was "the Department's opinion that the presence of slot
machines in Morale, Welfare, and Recreation facilities overseas does not
have a negative effect on the morale or financial stability" of their forces,
forces' families, or civilian employees. 4 1 However, the DOD 2001 SLOTS
REPORT did indicate that there were "instances where slot machine use has
had a negative impact on specific individuals., 42 Actually, the 1998
Department of Defense Survey of Health Related Behaviors Among
Military Personnel (DOD 1998 Health Among Military Report) had already
found that about 2.2 percent of military personnel had the indicators of
probable pathological gambling (compared with .77 to 1.6 percent in the
general public), 43 but the thirteen-page DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT
equivocated that "these results should not be considered to be a conclusive
indication that the prevalence of pathological gambling is higher in the
military personnel than among civilians." 44 This equivocation was a
non sequitur because the reported numbers were indeed a "conclusive
indication" that pathological gambling was higher in the military than in
the general public-as reported by several in-depth analyses to the 1999
U.S. National Gambling Impact Study Commission.4 5 Senior commanders
on the bases concluded that "the presence [as opposed to use] of these

39.
Id.
40.
Eadington Comment, supra note 5, at n.5.
41.
DOD 2001 SLOTs REPORT, supra note 25, at 3. See Eadington Comment, supra
note 5, at n.5.
42.
DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT, supra note 25, at 3.
43.
DOD 1998 HEALTH AMONG MILITARY, supra note 28.
44.

45.

DOD 2001 SLOTs REPORT, supra note 25, at 6.

Compare id., with NGISC

FINAL REPORT,

supra note 19, at 4-6, tbl. 4-2.
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machines produces no causative negative impact on morale or financial
well being of the force. 4 6 The DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT justified itself
stating that the Services' slot machines "include a high rate of return to the
player and high payout frequencies" combined with limited payout
amounts to discourage players from losing too much of their money by
going for big jackpots.47 However, these arguments were illusory because
they ignored the fundamental principles that slot machines are inherently
designed: to lure in the player, to keep the player thinking he is winning
when he is in fact losing, and eventually to take as much of the player's
assets as possible.
The DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT also claimed that the Services' slot
machines were neither promoted nor encouraged, but it was highlighted
that the revenue generated from slot machines constituted "a major
component of each Services' ability to fund nonappropriated fund
programs, capital investments and major construction. 4 8 Importantly, the
DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT indicated that the "[lioss of this revenue source
could not be replicated, 4 9 which perhaps indicated that monetary
considerations and creating the appearance of military readiness were
driving the DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT because it contradicted not only the
DOD's 1992 and 1998 reports,5 ° but also the Final Report of the National
Gambling Impact Study Commission.5'
The analysis and conclusions in the thirteen-page DOD 2001 SLOTS
REPORT, as well as the conflicts of interest in its authorship, were sharply
criticized in the press.5 2 The DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT was also compelled
to contradict earlier complaints about gambling from U.S. Command
Personnel. In 1995, General John M. Loh, Commander of the United
States Air Force (USAF) at Langley Air Force Base (AFB), replied to a
letter from U.S. Representative Herbert H. Bateman requesting General
Loh's views on the subject of riverboat gambling.53 General Loh stated, "I
am generally opposed to riverboat gambling near our bases because of the
problems it creates for our people and the communities in which they

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT, supra note 25, at 3.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 13.
See MILITARY PERSONNEL 1992 REPORT, supra note 27; DOD 1998 HEALTH
AMONG MILITARY, supra note 28, and accompanying text.
51.
NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 4-6, tbl. 4-2.
52.
See, e.g., Casey, supra note 37, at H I, H4.
53.
Letter from Gen. John M. Loh, Commander, U.S. Air Force, to U.S. Rep.
Herbert H. Bateman, Congressman (Feb. 10, 1995) (on file with U.S. Rep. Herbert H.
Bateman).
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live."5 4 General Loh also explained that key indicators of gambling's effect
on social and family issues had increased since the opening of riverboat
gambling operations near Barksdale AFB in Louisiana.55 In closing, the
General indicated: "These are my personal views and do not reflect any
official position of the Air Force or DoD. 5 6
A related 1995 memorandum to Virgina cities from business-related
representatives of Know Casinos, a non-profit organization dedicated to
"providing Virginia with factual information on riverboat gambling," gave
a brief overview of the negative issues surrounding riverboat gambling and
the military, including some specific information about the military base in
Tidewater, Virginia.5 7 The memorandum concluded that "[r]iverboat
gaming will drive our military away and cause us to lose whatever new
opportunities might become available., 58 The business-oriented authors
also found it hard to accept that city leaders would continue
to seek
59
gambling when there was "such an obvious negative impact.,
D.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES ON GAMBLING ISSUES: THE POTENTIAL

IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL AURA OF PRO-GAMBLING INTERESTS

1.

Attempted Censorship by Pro-GamblingInterests?

In 1998 Christopher Anderson, the Director of the Illinois Council on
Problem and Compulsive Gambling, served together on a three-person
panel with William Eadington and John Kindt and testified under oath
before the U.S. National Gambling Impact Study Commission. 60 While the
opportunity for debate was obvious, pro-gambling interests did not
challenge or address any of the issues raised involving the substantial
socio-economic costs of legalizing gambling activities, 6' but instead those

54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
57.
Memorandum from Know Casinos, Business Group, to Virginia Cities,
(Sept. I, 1995) (on file with Know Casinos).
58.
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
Christopher Anderson, William Eadington, and John W. Kindt, Panel
Testimony before the National Gambling Impact Study Commission (May 21, 1998);
NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, and accompanying text.
61.
Tables of the socio-economic costs of new addicted gamblers, bankruptcies,
and crime caused by decriminalized organized gambling, as presented at this hearing of the
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interests waited until 2003 before attempting any substantial rebuttal to
refute the socio-economic costs reported by several academics.6 2 However,
Christopher Anderson's testimony before the Commission, although
tactful, still cost Anderson his livelihood.
The controversy erupted after the council's outspoken
executive director, Christopher Anderson, publicly
criticized the casino boats for being too liberal with credit
and allowing hard-luck gamblers to dig themselves deeper
into debt. He says the Illinois Casino Gaming Assn.
promptly accused him of "biting the hand that feeds him."
Soon, he says, he was notified in writing that the council's
funding for the new year would be on a month-to-month
basis, with a 10-day termination clause.63
Since the Illinois Council was almost totally supported by $160,000
from the Illinois riverboat operators, their financial leverage was
considerable. These actions by the gambling industry were "interpreted as
interference and intimidation" by the Illinois Council. 64 "Outraged,
Anderson says the council severed its casino ties, closed its offices to save
money and moved into his living room. 65 According to Anderson,
"[e]veryone out there with casino money is obligated to stroke the casinos
.... To the extent that any of us accept dollars from the industry ... without66
the expectation that there are strings attached, then we're the fools.,
Representatives of the Illinois casino association countered that they simply
transferred their support to a private firm.67
The criticism of "censorship attempts" by pro-gambling interests was
also exemplified after a September 1993 seminar at Lake Tahoe, when

1999 U.S. Gambling Commission, were subsequently published as tables in John W. Kindt,
The Costs of Addicted Gamblers: Should the States Initiate Mega-Lawsuits Similar to the
Tobacco Cases?, 22 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 17, Tables (2001) [hereinafter MegaLawsuits].
See also John W. Kindt & John K. Palchak, Legalized Gambling's
Destabilization of U.S. Financial Institutions and the Banking Industry: Issues in
Bankruptcy, Credit, and Social Norm Production, 19 EMORY U. BANKRUPTCY DEV. J. 21
(2002) [hereinafter Gambling's Destabilization of Financial Institutions].
See, e.g., Gambling Flawed, supra note 2 1, and accompanying text.
62.
63.
Matea Gold, Treatment Options Scarce for Gamblers, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15,
1998, at AI [hereinafter Treatment Options].
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
Id
67.
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Whittier Law Professor I. Nelson Rose "ticked off' 6 8 Tom Tait, the
executive director of Nevada's Commission on Tourism, who issued "an
official state press release ' 69 alleging that "in his presentation before the
conference, I. Nelson Rose accused Nevada gaming officials and gaming
70
executives of being in 'cahoots,' calling their relationship corrupt.
Thereafter, Tait "uninvited" Professor Rose from a December statewide
Nevada convention on travel and tourism by removing Rose from the list of
speakers. 7 1 The statewide press editorialized against these actions limiting
Professor Rose from expressing his viewpoint.
Zounds. How dare this rapscallion Rose say such a thing.
No Nevada gaming official has ever gone to work for the
industry the day after he or she quit, right? No juice law
firm or gambling company would ever hire an
ex-regulator, would they? No law or p.r. firm ever got a
rack of politicians elected and then brokered influence in
favor of gaming license applicants, correct? And nobody
has ever accused the Nevada Supreme Court of jumping
through hoops for the gambling-industrial complex,
especially on those messy fire-at-will and employee
wrongful termination cases.
Iconoclastic Nelson Rose apparently committed the
unpardonable sin: he categorized the obvious, making him
pariah non grata at the Reno Hilton extravaganza. Rose
was needed.73
Mirroring First Amendment censorship issues, similar instances have
occurred with other academics 74 when interfacing with hypersensitive

68.
Andrew Barbano, Editorial, Clipping Coupons to Buy the Emperor New
Clothes, THE TRIBUNE (Reno, Nev.), Dec. 19, 1993 [hereinafter Buy the Emperor New
Clothes].
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
Wayne R. Melton, Panel Director Cuts Expert from List of Conference
Speakers, RENO GAZETrE-J., Dec. II, 1993, at C8; see Editorial, Gaming Critic Should
Have Been Admitted, RENO GAZE1T-E-J., Dec. 15, 1993, at I IA [hereinafter Gaming Critic
Should Have Been Admitted].
72.
See, e.g., Melton, supra note 71; Gaming Critic Should Have Been Admitted,
supra note 7 1.
73.
Buy the Emperor New Clothes, supra note 68.
74.
See, e.g., Press Release, Senate Republican Leadership, Conference at
Foxwoods Gives Long Odds on the Truth, Conn. Capitol Press Room, Nov. 8, 1995. See
also David Ferrell & Matea Gold, Casino Industry Fights an Emerging Backlash, L.A.
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pro-gambling interests. As exemplified at a 1995 Boston Federal Reserve
Bank Conference, gambling company representatives have also apparently
sent disparaging letters behind-the-scenes to conference organizers, trying
to discredit academic attendees/speakers, such as Professor Rose.75
As indicated in the Mega-Lawsuits article, those familiar with the
topics in gambling research typically agree that it is difficult to find
objective research regarding the impact of legalized gambling on
communities.7 6 In fact, "[miuch of the research that has been used in
government decision making was prepared by researchers with close ties to
the gambling industry."" As summarized by Professor Henry Lesieur of
the Institute for Problem Gambling in Connecticut:
There isn't one piece of research the industry has funded
on the social costs of problem gambling that is
academically respectable. It's all self-serving.... It says
a lot about the nature of the field that research funded by
the industry is going to dominate the dialogue for the next
few years. That is a sad state.7 8
State and federal government officials began to recognize these problems at
the end of the 1990s and expressed their frustration.
2.

The American Gaming Association's "Clearinghouseof Information"

In 1996, the lobbying group for the gambling industry, the American
Gaming Association (AGA), headed by Frank Fahrenkopf, announced that
part of the AGA's responsibility was "to develop a clearinghouse for
addressing industry issues, including problem gambling., 79 In this
"clearinghouse" context, concerns were raised about potential conflicts of
interest, such as in the following piece in the Los Angeles Times:

TIMES, Dec. 14, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Casino Backlash] (describing alleged harassment
of UNLV Prof. William Thompson). See also Wars on First Amendment, supra note 23.
75.
Joan Vennochi, High Stakes, BOSTON GLOBE, May 31, 1995, at 39.
76.

Meir Gross, Legal Gambling as a Strategy for Economic Development, 12

EcoN. DEV. Q. 203, 204 (1998).
77.
Id. at 204. See generally. Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 6 1.
78.
Casino Backlash, supra note 74, at A24.
79.
Gaming Association Acts as Clearinghouse, RENO GAZETTE-J. (Reno, Nev.),
Oct. 27, 1996, at B5 (emphasis added) [hereinafter AGA Clearinghouse].
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For years, [Howard] Shaffer had voiced some of the
harshest warnings in academia against the collateral
damage of gambling's growth. No longer, not since he
accepted nearly $600,000 in grants from the industry in
little more than a year.
Through Fahrenkopf's intervention, Shaffer was
awarded the first grant by the industry-backed research
center [NCRG]-$139,000 .... '8

The largely industry-financed National Center for Responsible
Gaming (NCRG), which had AGA lobbyist Frank Fahrenkopf as a Board
Member, was delimited as "the first national organization to serve as a
clearinghouse for information concerning problem and underage
gambling." 8' It was also reported that the NCRG's Advisory Board would
"have control over the researchagenda andfindings."82 Additional public

concerns involving research funded by pro-gambling interests were
mentioned.
The content of this first study by Shaffer was criticized,8 3
and it also did not report the most important baseline
numbers for the 120-152 studies analyzed,84 which made 85
it
verify.
and
check
to
academics
other
for
impossible

80.
Casino Backlash, supra note 74, at A I (emphasis added). For criticisms and
debates regarding academics receiving inordinate amounts of funding from pro-gambling
interests, see, e.g., Letter to the Editor from Jennifer Borrell, THE WAGER, available at
http://www.thewager.org/editorial.htm (Apr. 3, 2003) (on file with the author); Letter to the
Editor from Jacques Boulet, THE WAGER, available at http://www.thewager.org/
editorial.htm (Apr. 3, 2003) (on file with the author).
81.
Charles Ruud, Harvard Studies Gambling, FLORIDA PLAYER, Summer 1996,
at 3 (apparently from a press release of the National Center for Responsible Gaming).
82.
Id. (emphasis added).
83.
Casino Backlash, supra note 74, at A I; see Loretta Tofani, Gambling Industr.
Seeks a Winning inage, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 6, 1998, at A I [hereinafter Gambling Seeks
inage].
84.
Casino Backlash, supra note 74, at A I; Gambling Seeks Image, supra note 83,
at Al. See Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. Hall & Joni Vander Bilt, Div. ADDICTIONS,
HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL, App. 2, Estimating the Prevalence of Disordered Gambling
Behavior in the United States and Canada: A Meta-analysis, (Dec. 15, 1997) [hereinafter
Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis]; Press Release of Harvard Medical School, Harvard
Medical School Researchers Map Prevalence of Gambling Disorders in North America,
(Dec. 4, 1997) (stating that from .84 percent in 1993 "the prevalence rate for 1994-1997
grew to 1.29 percent of the adult population") [hereinafter Harvard Division on Addictions
Press Release].
85.

For press criticisms, see Casino Backlash, supra note 74, at Al (a classic series
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Despite requests dating to 1998,86 and despite promising to
provide these numbers during a 4 May 2000 conference
sponsored by the NCRG at the University of Illinois at
Chicago Medical Center, 87 by the end of 2000, Associate
Professor Shaffer had apparently not provided the
requested baseline numbers 88-a fairly simple procedure. 89
To avoid these types of issues, academics should be sensitized to making
data readily accessible and consider disassociating themselves from the
NCRG, which even industry reports have delimited as the "Center of
Controversy.' '90
These types of scenarios are illustrative of the problematic situations
in which academics/experts can find themselves. As summarized by a Los
Angeles Times article in December 1998, "Shaffer is now working on a
new project for the industry's research arm [the NCRG]-of which he is a
board member-for $465,000, more than triple the amount of the first
award."9 ' Supposedly concerned with some research issues at the NCRG
during this time frame,92 Professor Henry Lesieur and Dr. Richard
Rosenthal terminated their relationship with the NCRG research board.

in the L.A. TIMES); Gambling Seeks Image, supra note 83; David L. Wheeler, A Surge of
Research on Gambling is Financed in Part by the Industry Itself, CHRON. HIGHER EDuc.,
Mar. 5, 1999, at A 17-18 [hereinafter Research Financed by Industry]; Virginia Young,
Gambling Addiction: A No-Win Wager: Casinos Fund Problem Gambling Research;
Critics Worry About their Influence, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 10, 2000, at A9-A I0
[hereinafter Young]; Critics Question Casinos' Commitment to Finding Cause of Gambling
Addiction, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 10, 2000, at Al.
86.

Prof. John Warren Kindt, Univ. of Ill., Statement to the National Gambling

87.

Speaker's Question and Answer Session with Assoc. Prof. Howard Shaffer,

Impact Study Commission, U.S. and International Concerns Over the Socio-Economic
Costs of Legalized Gambling: Greater than the Illegal Drug Problem? Chicago, I11.
(May 21, 1998) [hereinafter U.S. and International Costs].

Understanding Gambling and Its Potential Health Consequences, Medical Ctr., Univ. of

Ill., Chicago, Ill. (May 4, 2000) (registration through the National Center for Responsible
Gaming).
88.
See, e.g., Letter from Univ. of I1l. Research Assoc., to Assoc. Prof. Howard
Shaffer (May 10, 2000) (requesting baseline numbers); Letter from Assoc. Prof. Howard
Shaffer to Univ. of I11.Research Assoc. (May 31, 2000) (stating uncertainty and declining to
provide the numbers).
89.

Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 61, at 27.

See also footnote 80, supra and

accompanying text.
Dave Palermo, Center of Controversy, CASINO EXEC. REP., Sept. 2001, at 4
90.
[hereinafter Center of Controversy].
91.
Casino Backlash, supra note 74, at A I (emphasis added).
See generally, id.
92.
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With regard to the NCRG's research, one criticism is that it is
pre-directed: "'[t]hey have an agenda,' says Valerie Lorenz, executive
director of the Compulsive Gambling Center Inc. in Baltimore. If the
industry can say something is neurologically wrong with a problem
gambler, 'then it's not the casinos' responsibility,' she says. 93
Among other academics, Professor Henry Lesieur and Dr. Richard
Rosenthal appeared to have made some difficult decisions concerning their
academic independence. In the Twenty-First Century, more academics
beginning research into gambling issues would be faced with ethical
decisions, and it became increasingly important to delimit the origins and
parameters of the issue areas.
3. The Credibilityof Pro-GamblingInterests: Issues Involving
Impeachment

a.

The Gravamen of Gambling Issues

The result of having industry-influenced academics and experts was
that incomplete studies were often created to flood decisionmakers with
information that obfuscated the obvious facts that legalized gambling
activities were addictive and destructive to local and national economic
systems. While the credibility of some academics/experts could be
impeached by showing the financial influence and other tactics the
gambling industry uses to influence information, that credibility could also
be criticized by analyzing the implausible and nonsensical claims of the
industry. In 2003, apologists for the gambling industry tried to refute the
principles establishing the addictive nature of Video Gambling Devices
(VGDs) 94 and discounted the negative socio-economic impacts of gambling
activities.95

93.
Young, supra note 85.
94.
See Video Crack, supra note 29, at 58. See also Casino Backlash, supra note
74, at Al.
95.
Video Crack, supra note 29, at 58; Casino Backlash, supra note 74, at Al. See
generally, Gambling Flawed, supra note 21.
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b. The Crack Cocaine of CreatingNew Addicted Gamblers:
Electronic/Video Gambling Devices
Defenders of the gambling industry are exemplified by the arguments
of William Eadington, who has implied that electronic gambling devices
(EGDs) and video gambling machines (VGMs) are not addictive and that
comparing them to drug addictions constitutes an overreaction.96 The fact,
however, is that it is generally accepted within the sociological community
that pathological gambling can be fairly compared to drug addiction.97
Even Eadington's associate and co-editor of the Journal of Gambling
Studies, Associate Professor Howard Shaffer, who serves at the Harvard
Division on Addictions and who has conducted studies financed by
pro-gambling interests, has made several comparisons between
pathological gambling and the addictive nature of drugs. In 1997 Shaffer
concluded that gambling problems were "approaching the level of social
problems such as drug abuse. 98 In the 1999 National Gambling Impact
Study Commission's Final Report, Shaffer is quoted as follows: "The
director of the Harvard Medical School's Division on Addiction Studies,
Dr. Howard J. Shaffer, likened the Internet to new delivery forms for
addictive narcotics. He states, 'As smoking crack cocaine changed the
cocaine experience, I think electronics is going to change the way gambling
is experienced.' 99
In another instance, Shaffer reiterated his findings:
One of the nation's foremost experts on gambling
addiction, Harvard Medical School Professor Howard
Shaffer, was the first to call video poker the "crack cocaine
of gambling."...

96.
97.

See Eadington Comment, supra note 5.
See, e.g., Marvin A. Steinberg, Therese A. Kosten, & Bruce J. Rounsaville,

Cocaine Abuse and Pathological Gambling, I AM. J. ADDICTIONS 121, 122-132 (Spring
1992); Adolescent Gambling and Problem Gambling in Alberta, ALTA. ALCOHOL & DRUG

ABUSE COMM'N, (Wynne Resources, Ltd. 1994); Alberta Adolescent Substance Use
Increases with Gambling Involvement, THE WAGER, Oct. 1996, at 1; Bill Lindelof,
Gambling Now Perceived More as Entertainment than Sin, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 8, 1998,

at Al.[hereinafter Lindelof] (according to Howard Shaffer's 1997 study, gambling problems
were "approaching the level of social problems such as drug abuse"). Contra Eadington
Comment, supra note 5.
Lindelof, supra note 97.
98.
99.

NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 5-5.
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"These fast-acting games are like fast-acting drugs.
You get a rush (when you win), and then you're off, and
you're still there to play again," he added.
Even though no drug is involved, Shaffer said many
gambling addicts show some signs of physical withdrawal
when they stop feeding their habit-just
as if they were
°
hooked on heroin and in need of a fix. 0
Shaffer even drew comparisons between gambling addiction and the
mega-lawsuits involving the smokers who pursued the 1990s tobacco
litigation. "Shaffer said some gambling addicts have sued slot machine
manufacturers, following the example set by victims of cigarette smokers
who went after tobacco companies ... None of it has been successful yet,
but it wasn't for the tobacco industry for a long time" (emphasis added).' 0'
As early as 1994, Shaffer summarized these issues and reportedly
concluded as follows,
between 3.5 and 5 percent of those adults exposed to
gambling can be expected to develop into pathological
gamblers. Even more disturbing, the percentage is higher
(6 to 8.5 percent) for college and high school students,
according to Shaffer's most recent research. "It's like
crack was2 to cocaine.
It's becoming too easy to
0
gamble."
Accordingly, Mr. Eadington has little academic support for his
apparent rejection of the sociologists' identifier for video gambling and
other "fast gambling" mechanisms as the "crack cocaine" of creating new
pathological (addicted) gamblers.
c.

The Socio-Economic Costs of DecriminalizedOrganized Gambling

From an academic perspective, Mr. Eadington is also unconvincing
when he repeatedly tries to refute Nobel-Prize Laureate Paul
Samuelson' S103 conclusions about the negative economic impacts of

100.

Scott Dyer, Capital News Bureau, ProfessorSays Video Poker 'Crack Cocaine'

of Gambling, ADVOC., Feb. 16, 2001.
101.
Id.
102.
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., supra note 1, at 38.
103.
Paul Samuelson won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1970.
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gambling activities.1' 4 Nor does Mr. Eadington appear to grasp the
significance that Professor Samuelson's comments constitute basic
textbook economics. 105
In particular, Mr. Eadington criticizes the references to Professor
Samuelson's comments which highlight the negative economic impacts of
gambling activities. Eadington has implied that references in Professor
Samuelson's textbook may have consisted of offhand comments which
Samuelson had not seriously studied. 0 6 The Samuelson quote at issue
stated:
[Gambling] involves simply sterile transfers of money or
goods between individuals, creating no new money or
goods. Although it creates no output, gambling does
nevertheless absorb time and resources. When pursued
beyond the limits of recreation, where the main purpose
time, gambling subtracts from the
after all is to "kill"
07
national income. 1
Mr. Eadington's implication, however, that Professor Samuelson has
not seriously analyzed the economics of gambling activities, is also
dispelled by referencing the classic 1948 article by Milton Friedman and
L. J. Savage, entitled The Utility Analysis Of Choices Involving Risk, 108
which constituted an in-depth academic study of utility and gambling
activities. This study was an exhaustive analysis of the general principles
enumerated in Samuelson's textbook in his section Gambling and
Diminishing Marginal Utility. More importantly, when this classic
Friedman and Savage article was reprinted in 1952, the authors made a
"grateful" acknowledgement to Paul Samuelson who had obviously studied
their article and who had suggested the one correction which was
incorporated into the reprinted version of the article. 109

104.
105.

106.

See Eadington Comment, supra note 5.
See, e.g., PAULA. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 425 ( 10th ed. 1976).

Id.

PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 398 (11th ed. 1980) (emphasis added);
107.
compare with PAUL A. SAMUEL-SON, ECONOMICS 425 (10th ed. 1976). See generally, John
W. Kindt, Diminishing or Negating the Multiplier Effect: The Transfer of Consumer Dollars
to Legalized Gambling; Should a Negative Socio-Economic "Crime Multiplier" be Included
in Gambling Cost/Benefit Analyses?, 2003 MIcH. ST. DCL L. REV. 281 [hereinafter
Gambling's Crime Multiplier Effect].
108.
Milton Friedman & L. J. Savage, The Utility Analysis Of Choices Involving
Risk, 56 J.POL. EcON., 279-304 (1948).

109.

Milton Friedman & L. J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving
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John Kenneth Galbraith referred to Samuelson as the "most influential
[economics] teacher of our time,"'" 0o but Samuelson's views on gambling
have been repeatedly attacked by the American Gaming Association. The
American Gaming Association, lobbying for the gambling industry, has
even claimed that legalized gambling activities have an economic
multiplier effect of "four,""' a nonsensical claim. As decriminalized
organized gambling spread throughout the U.S. economy of the 1990s, the
increased
commentary,
which
Samuelson
devoted
to
the
gambling/economic interface, was illustrative. For example, Samuelson
reaffirmed his position in a later edition of his text which is significant
enough to quote at length:
Gambling has historically been a "vice" that was -- along
with illegal drugs, commercial sex, alcohol and tobacco -a "consumption activity" discouraged by the state.
Attitudes about such vices ebb and flow. Over the last two
decades, attitudes toward gambling became permissive as
those toward drugs and tobacco hardened. . . . [The]
spread [of gambling] was accompanied by the rapid growth
of state lotteries. Overall, gambling has been one of the
fastest growing sectors of the (legal)
economy in the last
2
two decades [1980s and 1990s]."
Samuelson also differentiated economic
speculation from
decriminalized organized gambling-which gambling lobbyists frequently
argue are the same concept in their efforts to decriminalize more gambling
activities as the Twenty-First Century began.
Gambling is a differential animal from speculation. While
ideal speculative activity increases economic welfare,
gambling raises serious economic issues. To begin with,
aside from recreational value, gambling does not create

Risk, reprinted in AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, READINGS IN PRICE THEORY 57-96

(Prof. Samuelson acknowledged in introductory footnote and in footnote 24 on page 71).
110.

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 4 (Houghton

Mifflin Co., Boston 1973).
Ill.
Panel Discussion of the American Gaming Assoc. and Casino Company
Representatives, Nat'l Press Foundation Conf., Arlington, Va., Jan. 13-15, 1997. See also
Gambling's Crime Multiplier Effect, supra note 107.
112.
PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 208-09 (17th ed.

2001).
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goods and services. In the language of game theory ...
gambling is a "negative-sum game" for the players-the
customers are (almost) sure to lose in the long run because
the house takes a cut of all bets. In addition, by its very
nature gambling increases income inequality. People who
sit down to the gambling table with the same amount of
money go away with widely different amounts.
A
of
the
world
one
gambler's family must expect to be on top
week only to be living on crumbs and remorse when luck
changes. Some observers also believe that gambling has
adverse social impacts.
These include addiction to
gambling, neighborhood crime, political corruption, and
infiltration of gambling by organized crime.
Given the substantial economic case against gambling,
how can we understand the recent trend to legalize
gambling and operate government lotteries? One reason is
that when states are starved for tax revenues, they look for
new sources; they rationalize lotteries and casinos in a way
to channel private vices to the public interest by skimming
off some of the revenues to finance public projects. In
addition, by bringing gambling above ground, legal
gambling may drive out illegal numbers rackets and take
some of the profitability out of organized crime.
Notwithstanding these rationales, many observers raise
questions about an activity in which the state profits by
promoting irrational behavior among those who can least
afford it.3

While individualized gambling activities have accompanied the
history of mankind, government-sanctioned gambling activities, including
those by military organizations, have historically resulted in
socio-economic negatives that outweighed any positives. 1 4 Furthermore,
gambling activities constitute a "sterile transfer of wealth" which restricts
genuine economic growth. The opportunity costs to those governments
which legalize gambling activities consist, in part, of lost worker and

113.
Id.; see Gambling's Destabilization of Financial Institutions, supra note 61, at
54-56.
114.
See generally, Gambling's Destabilizing Economies, supra note 6; Gambling's
Destabilization of Economies, supra note 20; Gambling's Perpetual Non-Compliance, supra
note 18.
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military productivity as well as lost "consumer dollars.""' 5 While the
introduction of gambling-oriented dollars into a local economy may have a
multiplier effect, there is a growing body of evidence that in most
economic scenarios the gambling multiplier is significantly
less than the
6
lost multiplier associated with lost consumer dollars. 1
Accordingly, governments and concomitant military organizations
have experimented with legalized (or tolerated) gambling activities
throughout history, sometimes referenced as waves of gambling. As the
public and the military have relearned the significant costs which
invariably accompany gambling, governments have reverted to the
recriminalization of gambling activities." 7
These examples suggest the absence of credibility by informational
sources linked to the financial aura of the gambling industry, but they are
not the only instances. Attacks on academics by pro-gambling interests
demonstrate how pro-gambling misinformation can enter the
decisionmaking environment and lead to the reliance of well-intentioned
decisionmakers on information of dubious quality and credibility.

115.
Gambling's DestabilizingEconomies, supra note 6; Gambling'sDestabilization
of Economies, supra note 20; Gambling's Perpetual Non-Compliance, supra note 18;
Gambling's Destabilizationof Financial Institutions,supra note 61, at 56. See Gambling's
Crime Multiplier Effect, supra note 107. See also, John W. Kindt, The Economic Impacts of
Legalized Gambling Activites, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 51, Table 3 (1994).
116.
Gambling's DestabilizingEconomies, supra note 6; Gambling's Destabilization
of Economies, supra note 20; Gambling's Perpetual Non-Compliance, supra note 18;
Gambling's Destabilizationof FinancialInstitutions,supra note 61, at 56. See Gambling's
Crime Multiplier Effect, supra note 107. See also John W. Kindt, Legalized Gambling
Activites: The Issues Involving Market Saturation, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 271 (1995).
117.
Gambling's DestabilizingEconomies, supra note 6; Gambling's Destabilization
of Economies, supra note 20; Gambling's Perpetual Non-Compliance, supra note 18;
Gambling's Destabilization of Financial Institutions, supra note 61, at 56. See, e.g.,
Strategic Economic Base, supra note 4, at 584; Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995,
supra note 4, at 527, 545; The National Impact of Casino Gambling Proliferation: Hearing
before the House Comm. on Small Business, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. at 77, 79-80, nn.9-12
[hereinafter Congressional Gambling Hearing 1994]. John W. Kindt, The BusinessEconomic Impacts of Licensed Casino Gambling in West Virginia: Short-Term Gain but
Long-Term Pain, 13 W. VA. U. PUB. AFF. REP. 22 (1996).
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I.

A.

THE

1998

CLARIFICATION OF GOALS

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SURVEY
OF HEALTH RELATED
118

BEHAVIORS AMONG MILITARY PERSONNEL

The DOD 1998 Health Among Military Report provided
"comprehensive and detailed estimates of the prevalence of alcohol, illicit
drug, and tobacco use and the negative effects of alcohol use" 19 and gave
estimates for health behaviors "pertaining to fitness and cardiovascular
disease risk reduction, injuries and injury prevention, and sexually
transmitted disease risk reduction."'' 20 The 1998 Report also offered "an
assessment of the mental health of military personnel, including stress and
depression, and examines oral health and dental check-ups, gambling
behaviors, and special gender-specific health issues."' 2'
In the section of the report on military gambling, it was noted that
8.1% of the total DOD group "had experienced at least one of the eight
gambling related problems in their lifetime, indicating problem gambling,
and 2.2% experienced at least three of these gambling related problems, the
level constituting probable pathological gambling." 22 Researchers also
presented findings on the relationship between gambling and drinking.
According to the researchers, "data on drinking levels indicate an increased
likelihood of a person in the military being a problem or pathological
gambler with higher drinking levels, although the vast majority (84.8%) of
23
heavy drinkers had never experienced any gambling-related problems."',
The researchers explained that if personnel were not screened for gambling
problems when they were admitted into alcohol treatment, their problems
might go unnoticed. 24 They also concluded that there might be a "higher
prevalence of gambling-related problems"25 in those personnel who had
undetected or untreated alcohol problems.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

124.
125.

DOD
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

1998 HEALTH AMONG MILITARY, supra note 28.
iii (Preface and Acknowledgements).

§ 9.20.
§ 9.23.
DOD 1998 HEALTH AMONG MILITARY, supra note 28, at § 9.24.

Id. at § 9.23-24.
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B.
GAMBLERS IN THE MILITARY: REDUCING THE HIGH RATES OF
PATHOLOGICAL AND PROBLEM GAMBLING

In 1997, a group of Harvard associates analyzed the topic of
"Gamblers in the Military"'' 2 6 by reviewing the DOD Military Personnel
1992 Report'27 conducted by the Research Triangle Institute and directed
by the Department of Defense.1 28 The survey examined substance abuse
and health-related behaviors and was the first DOD survey to include
questions about problem gambling. 129 According to the authors at the
Harvard Medical School Division on Addictions who reviewed the survey,
the researchers "hypothesized that problems related to excessive gambling
could affect the financial and psychological well-being of military
130
personnel, which could have a negative effect on military readiness."'
The survey showed that 7.1 percent of the respondents had a gamblingrelated problem, and .2percent met the criteria for probable pathological
gambling.' 31 The 1992 survey was also used to examine the relationships
between problem gambling and alcohol use. Problems with gambling were
found to be more common in heavy drinkers as distinguished from
abstainers and light drinkers, but "nearly 90%
of heavy drinkers had never
32
gambling."'
with
problems
any
experienced
C.

DATA COLLECTION ON GAMBLING PROBLEMS IN THE MILITARY:

SCREENING VETERANS FOR PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING

In 1998, the Harvard Medical School Division on Addictions reported
on research involving the screening of veterans for pathological
gambling. 33 The Division on Addictions indicated that "individuals with
substance abuse or other psychiatric disorders have been shown to have
higher rates of pathological gambling disorders than individuals without
psychiatric disorders."' 134 At the time of reporting, the researchers had
"routinely screened a sample of 250 veterans with substance abuse and/or

126.
Gamblers in the Military, THE WAGER, Sept. 2, 1997 at I [hereinafter Gamblers
in the Military].
127.
MILITARY PERSONNEL 1992 REPORT, supra note 27.
128.
Id. at iii.
129.
Gamblers in the Military, supra note 126.
130.
Id.
131.
Id.
132.
Id.
133.
Screening Veterans for Pathological Gambling, THE WAGER, Apr. 7, 1998, at 1.
134.
Id.
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other psychiatric disorders" in the previous three years for lifetime
pathological gambling disorders. 35 Using the South Oaks Gambling
Screen (SOGS), 16 percent of the veterans screened positive for
pathological gambling while 9 percent screened positive for "probable
pathological gambling."' 36 In a medical record review of veterans found
positive for pathological gambling, researchers reported that "only 1 had
been diagnosed with a pathological gambling disorder."' 37 Also, compared
to a non-problem group, the researchers revealed that "pathological
gamblers were admitted significantly more often for psychiatric problems
and for drug or alcohol detoxification,"'' 38 and it was reported that these
research estimates fell39within the range given by a Harvard meta-analysis
of prevalence studies. 1
IV.

A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

PATHOLOGICAL AND PROBLEM GAMBLING IN THE MILITARY

From 1992 data provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce
(DOC) as part of a worldwide health survey of military personnel, 140 it was
reported in 1998 that "Since 1991 Legalized Gambling has Destabilized the
'Readiness' of U.S. Military Personnel by a 66% Increase in Addicted
Gambling."' 4' This DOC data revealed that of the 1.5 million military
personnel in the Armed Services in 1991, 2 percent were pathological
42
gamblers, while approximately 5 percent were problem gamblers.
According to the DOC data, if both the "pathological" and "problem"
gambler categories increased proportionally from 1994-1997, a 66 percent
increase would occur by 1997, which would represent approximately
50,250 and 162,000 military personnel in the pathological and problem

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
Addictions
prevalence
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis, supra note 84, App. II; Harvard Division on
Press Release, supra note 84 (stating that from .84 percent in 1993 "the
rate for 1994-1997 grew to 1.29 percent of the adult population.").
MILITARY PERSONNEL 1992 REPORT, supra note 27, at 12-14 to 12-30.

141.
U.S. and International Costs, supra note 86, tbl. 11. Although sitting on the
panel when this data was presented, William Eadington made no comment or challenge on
the data.
142.

MILITARY PERSONNEL 1992 REPORT, supra note 27, at 12-14 to 12-30.
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gambling categories, respectively. 143 These conclusions and concerns were
not effectively dispelled by the cursory DOD 2001 Slots Report. '44
B.
U.S. SENATOR ESTES
KEFAUVER AND THE
45
ILLEGAL GAMBLING 1

1950S HEARINGS ON

In the 1940s and 1950s, the Gold Coast of Mississippi harbored many
sites of illegal gambling which were purported to make the Coast more
attractive to tourists. 146 In the 1990s the gambling joints were replaced by
legalized casino hotels credited with igniting the "Mississippi miracle," an
economic boom. 147 Investigations into the Mississippi clubs' gambling
activities began in 1950 with hearings conducted by U.S. Senator Estes
Kefauver and continued into 1951 when he transferred control of the probe
over to U.S. Senator Lyndon Johnson. These investigations caused a
temporary halt in some of the then illegal gambling activity. 48 Senator
Kefauver contended that "open gambling and liquor posed a threat to the
military preparedness of airmen"'' 49 and the illegal "gambling, Kefauver
said, was eating up [twelve to twenty percent] ... of Keesler's $4 million
monthly payroll."' 150 Also, two lieutenants at the base committed suicide
over gambling debts.' 5 ' In 1998 military readiness was obviously still a
concern as there were "reports of suicides and enlisted men pawning their
uniforms to pay gambling debts."' 52 However, Major General James
Powell, commander of Keesler AFB, believed that the situation was "a
civilian problem, not a military one."'' 53 He concluded that the problem

143.
144.
145.
129 Before

See id.
Casey, supra note 37, at HI, H4.
Investigation of Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce: Hearings on S. Res.
the Special Comm. to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce,

82nd Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1950-1951 ) [hereinafter Kefauver Hearings]; THE KEFAUVER COMM.
REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME, 174-193 (Didier Books 1951) [hereinafter KEFAUVER
REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME].

146.
Dave Palermo, The Day Gambling Died 1951 Hearing Snuffed Coast's
Business-For Awhile, SUN HERALD (Biloxi, Miss.), Aug. 23, 1998, at Al [hereinafter
Gambling 1951 Hearing].
147.
Id.
148.
Id. See also Kefauver Hearings, supra note 145; KEFAUVER REPORT ON
ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 145.
149.
Gambling 1951 Hearing, supra note 146, at Al.
150. Id.
151.
Id.
152.
Id.
153.
Id.
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"must be met by the citizens of the community and their elected leaders."', 54
Even so, by 1999 this gambling region had experienced thirteen gamblingrelated suicides during a 2-year period among military personnel55and their
families, and the military instituted gambling-education courses.,
V.

A.

TRENDS AND CONDITIONING FACTORS

CASE STUDIES: CASINOS ON THE MISSISSIPPI COAST

Serious attempts to rid the Mississippi Gulf Coast of illegal gambling
began in 1951 when U.S. Senator Estes Kefauver and the Preparedness
Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services held a
hearing in Biloxi, Mississippi. 156 However, by 1989 an oxymoron of
legislative action was proposed toward legalizing formal gambling. Via
quick action and carefully crafted scenarios, casino lobbyists were able to
clear hurdle after hurdle, dodging "Christian" legislators and avoiding
social-impact studies. 57 One Mississippi legislator complained that "[lit
all happened so fast, we hardly had time to vote on the bill, much less read
it.' 58 Legislators did not take the time to consider the possible costs of
legalizing gambling, such as increased crime rates, pathological and
problem gambling, higher taxes to address highway and sanitation system
demands, and harmful effects upon existing businesses. 59 Although the
casinos improved overall economic conditions in localized areas like
Tunica County, the gap between blacks and whites widened as "casino
carpetbaggers"'160 continued to argue they were creating jobs and revenue.
The gambling industry was criticized for utilizing "racial, ethnic, and
religious targeting." 16 1 Ben Toledano concluded that decriminalized

154.

Id.

155.
Military Personnel Panel Discussion and Report, (KAIM-296 radio broadcast,
Honolulu, Hawaii, Mar. 25, 1999).
Ben C. Toledano, Gambling 'Carpetbaggers' Make Mississippi a Lesson to
156.
Other States, WORLD HERALD (Omaha, Neb.), Apr. 13, 1997, at B 13 (abbreviated reprint
from Apr. 7 article in NAT'L REV.) [hereinafter Toledano]. See also, Kefauver Hearings,
supra note 145; KEFAUVER REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 145.
157.
Toledano, supra note 156, at B 13.
158.
Id.
159.
Id.
160.
Id.
Id.
161.
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organized gambling led "to political
control over individuals, communities,
1 62
and local and state governments."
B.

UNCLE SAM'S MILITARY CASINOS

As the Twenty-First Century began, a "depressed" Gloria Calhoun, a
USAF technical sergeant stationed in South Korea, wrote approximately
$14,000 in bad checks to pay for the debts she accumulated from slot
machine playing around her base. 63 The Department of Defense received
from people like Sergeant Calhoun "a tidy sum [$125 million in 2000]
from more than 7,000 slot and video poker machines on 94 U.S. military
installations overseas. ' ' 64
Pentagon officials argued that gambling
revenues constituted "an essential and harmless source of funding,"'' 65 yet
Sergeant Calhoun was demoted and given a sixty-day jail sentence due to
this "harmless" way to pay for U.S. morale boosters. 166 As an example, the
question remained:
"What was and is Sergeant Calhoun's military
readiness level?" Experts on gambling addiction have demonstrated that
gambling can foster a dependency that may lead to criminal behaviors like
Sergeant Calhoun's. 167 In 2002, the national media reported on two of the
DOD's studies which concluded that approximately two percent of U.S.
military personnel (or 30,000 people) had the "indicators of probable
pathological gambling," a startling figure suggesting that these people
could act similarly to Sergeant Calhoun. 68 In the national press, the
Pentagon's Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Department was castigated for
ignoring these problems when the Department announced that "[silot
machines have no negative impact on troops overseas."' 69

162.
163.

Id.
Mark Mazzetti, Military Casinos:
NEWS & WORLD REP., May 20, 2002, at 36.
164.
Id.
165.
Id.
166.
Id.
167.
Id.
168.
Id.
169.
Id.

Uncle Sam's One-Armed Bandits, U.S.
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VI. POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A.

BAN ALL GAMBLING IN THE U.S. MILITARY

1.

Prohibitionof Command-SanctionedMilitary Gambling

In 2001, President George W. Bush began taking a Harvard MBA
look at the military, which included establishing clear strategic objectives,
motivating military personnel via higher pay to achieve those objectives,
and determining the cost effectiveness of weapons systems in meeting
proscribed objectives. 7 ° According to the Christian Science Monitor,
"[t]he welfare of our troops would be improved if the Pentagon also took a
good hard look at the vice of gambling that it permits and perpetuates on
military bases."' 17 1 During the early 1990s, the U.S. Army's Community
and Family Support Center considered running an official lottery on
overseas U.S. military bases and paid $49,000 for a worldwide sample of
military opinion. 172 Apparently, the Pentagon abandoned the project
pursuant to the evidence of increased addicted gambling; however,
thousands of video poker and slot machines continued to be operated on
overseas military bases. 173 The impacts of these machines on military
personnel can be devastating, especially to those with a gambling
addiction. This was the case for Senior Airman Lenyatta Tinelle, who in
one year lost $28,000 while serving at the Keflavik, Iceland base.174 U.S.
Representative Roscoe Bartlett concluded that these slot machines should
be eliminated and has expressed his concern saying "We have no right to
put this type of temptation in front of our young people."'' 75 Accordingly,
the President has been urged to eliminate these machines on U.S. military
with the espoused good management
bases, which would be consistent
76
approach toward military issues. 1

170.

John Hughes, Cut Military Gambling, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Boston),

Feb. 21, 2001, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.comdurable/2001/02/21/fp9s2csm.shtml.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
173.
Id.
174.
Id.
175.
Id.
176.
Id.
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The Cost/Benefit of Military Gambling Machines

a. Decreased "MilitaryReadiness" for Benefits of Only $127 Million in
Military Welfare Funds?
It was arguable that the military's overseas slot machines were a
gamble in themselves.177 The proponents of the slot machines argued that
the $127 million in income from the slots was needed to support programs
in the military. 178 Those against military slot machines focused on the
harmful effects on addicted military personnel and their families. 179 By
1999, there were ninety-four bases and other posts that possessed slot
machines, and the $127 million lost by military personnel was used to fund
"morale, welfare, and recreation" activities.180 According to Arnie Wexler,
a consultant on pathological and problem gambling, "[t]hey're [the
military] taking money from their own people and dependents of those
people."' 8' Accordingly, experts recommended that the military should
prohibit electronic gambling devices, video poker machines, and other
modern forms of slots which sociologists commonly referenced "as the
82
crack cocaine of gambling, creating new, addicted gamblers."'
b.

The Strategic Costs of PathologicalGambling

1.

The 1999 AustraliaProductivity Commission183

In Australia more was gambled away in 1999 than was saved by the
184
public, and the pathological gambling rate was 2.3 percent.

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Slot Machines Military's Gamble, supra note 29, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. See, e.g., Video Crack, supra note 29, at 58.

PRODUCTIVITY
COMM'N,
AUSTRALIA'S
GAMBLING
INDUSTRIES
(1999)
AUSTRALIA PROD. COMM'N].
See AUSTRALIAN INST. GAMBLING RESEARCH,
SURVEY OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF GAMBLING AND PROBLEM GAMBLING IN THE ACT

[hereinafter

(2001) (giving an update of costs per problem gambler).
184.
Hon. Nick Xenophon, Member, Legislative Council, South Australia, Speech at
the Annual Conference of the National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling and the
National Coalition Against Gambling Expansion (Sept. 24-26, 1999) [hereinafter Xenophon
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Significantly, 1.5 percent of the gross domestic product involved wagers in
legalized gambling activities.
There were 18 million people in Australia,
and in 1992, they lost $5 billion in legalized gambling activities., 86 By
1998, this amount had more than doubled to $11 billion187 and half of that
amount was88lost in electronic gambling devices (including video gambling
machines). 1
2. The Socio-Economic Costs of Each New Pathological(Addicted)
Gambler
Prior to the mid-1990s, the medical and social costs associated with
treating and remedying the negatives committed by the individual
pathological gambler ranged between $13,200 and $52,000 (unadjusted to
present value). 189 The higher numbers were published and/or verified in a
reviewed article published in the Journal of Gambling Behavior.190 The
higher end of the spectrum was given the actual or implied imprimatur of
the Journal-even though the Journalwas influenced, to a greater or lesser
degree, by the interests of the gambling industry. In particular, William
Eadington became one of the two main editors of the Journal when its
predecessor, the Journalof Gambling Behavior,ran into financial difficulty
and needed the support of the gambling industry.
Professor Henry Lesieur, the originator and first editor of the Journal
of Gambling Behavior (renamed the Journal of Gambling Studies in 1990
with William Eadington as co-editor) repeatedly reported statistics on
pathological gambling and its associated costs. 19 1 These costs closely
paralleled those statistics and tables in the 2001 Mega-Lawsuits article.
Since the cost estimates ranging up to $52,000 per pathological
gambler were published and the methodology of determining them verified
by the Journal,the gambling industry has been trying to lower these cost

Speech].

185.

186.
187.

AUSTRALIA PROD. COMM'N, supra note 183, at 2.

Xenophon Speech, supra note 184.
AUSTRALIA PROD. COMM'N, supra note 183, at 2.
188. Xenophon Speech, supra note 184.
189.
For a summary of the socio-economic costs as of 1994, see Congressional
Gambling Hearing 1994, supra note 117, at 77, 79-80, nn.9-12.
190.
Robert M. Politzer, James S. Morrow, Sandra B. Leavey, Report on the CostBenefit/Effectiveness of Treatment at the Johns Hopkins Center for Pathological Gambling,
I J. GAMBLING BEHAV. 131, 131-42 (1985).
191.
See, e.g., Henry R. Lesieur, Experience of Employee Assistance Programs with
Pathological Gamblers, 19 J. DRUG IssuEs 425 (1989).
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estimates via promoting new studies. 92 Critics of the gambling industry
found it ironic that apologists for the gambling industry, including Mr.
Eadington, had not questioned any of these higher cost estimates
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s-even though they claimed years of
experience in analyzing these issues.193 Since the mid-1990s, the gambling
industry has endeavored to promulgate new cost estimates-which
as
194
might be expected, have been lower than the earlier estimates.
c. DecriminalizedGambling: The "Acceptability Factor"andthe
"Accessibility Factor"
For decades pro-gambling interests would not recognize that gambling
created pathological and problem gamblers until an industry-financed study
revealed that "Legality Spreads The Compulsion to Gamble,"' 95 as reported
by the New York Times. "Casino industry executives, who market their
products as harmless adult entertainment, until [December 1997] had been
loathe to concede that some gamblers become addicted."'' 96 That more
people will
become hooked on gambling as it is "legalized"'' 97 and
"spreads"'' 98 to new jurisdictions (known as the "acceptability" and
"accessibility" principles) was summarized by Howard Shaffer when he
reported on his 1997 study of pathological and problem gamblers: "The
people who are most sensitive to social sanctions or social
pressures only
1 99
began to gamble when it became legal in more places."'

192.

See generally, Research Financedby Industry, supra note 85, at A 17. See also

193.

See, e.g., Congressional Hearing on Gambling Impact Commission, supra

Casino Backlash, supra note 74, at Al.

note 2 1, at 160.
194.
See Casino Backlash, supra note 74, at Al; Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 61, at

31-32. See generally Research Financedby Industry, supra note 85, at A 17.
195.
Brett Pulley, Study Finds Legality Spreads The Compulsion to Gamble, N.Y.

TIMES, Dec 7, 1997, § I, at 42 [hereinafter Gambling Spreads Due to Legality]. See
generally Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis, supra note 84; Harvard Division on
Addictions Press Release, supra note 84.
196.

197.

Gambling Spreads Due to Legality, supra note 195, at 42.

Id.

198.
Derrick DePledge, Gambling Boom Breeds Troubled Players, DES MOINES
REG., Dec. 5, 1997, at A6.

199.

Id. (emphasis added).
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B.
RECOGNIZE ERRONEOUS INFORMATION IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM:
CREDIBILITY ISSUES AND PRO-GAMBLING INFLUENCES

1.

Recommendation: Follow the Money

In the Twenty-First Century Age of Terrorism, as in all important
issue areas, accurate information is essential.
The importance of
communicating relevant, authoritative, and current information that "could
have foiled some of the 9/11 hijackers ' '2°° was highlighted by the 2001
attacks on the World Trade Center. 201 In this context, some industries
might have an inherent interest in repressing or controlling information that
could damage or even eliminate their financial base. Accordingly,
credibility issues become important and in a legal context, the
impeachment of industry informational sources becomes relevant. In 1994,
the Columbia Journalism Review indicated what the threshold test is:
Follow the Money. °2
2. Recommendation: Encourage the Academic Community to Divorce
Itselffrom the Directand IndirectFinancialAura of Pro-Gambling
Interests
During the 1990s, national U.S. press sources raised issues involving
the appearance of direct and/or indirect conflicts of interest in the interface
between academics/experts and pro-gambling interests. 203 The only
practical method for avoiding such criticisms was for impacted members of
the academic community to divorce themselves completely from a financial
interface with pro-gambling interests. Accordingly, some academics/
experts, such as several at the University of Illinois, refused to receive any
honoraria, consultant fees, or even grants from any pro-gambling interests
or other special interests.
In the article The Costs of Addicted Gamblers: Should the States
Initiate Mega-Lawsuits Similar to the Tobacco Cases?204 (Mega-Lawsuits)
it was appropriate to recap some of the issues already raised by the national

200.
Romesh Ratnesar & Michael Weisskopf, How the FBI Blew the Case, TIME,
June 3, 2002, at Front Cover.
201.
Id. at 24-32.
202.
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., supra note 1, at 36-38.
203.
See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 201-11.
204.

Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 61.
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media involving the financial aura projected by pro-gambling interests and
the potential impeachment of witnesses. Contrary to implications by
gambling industry apologists that only one national news outlet had raised
these issues, these types of issues have been raised for example by:
205
a. The Chronicle of Higher Education,
20 6
Inquirer,
b. The Philadelphia
c.
A series of Los Angeles Times articles, °7
d. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch,°8
e. The New York Times,2°9
• •
210
f. A series of articles in Mother Jones Investigative Magazine,
and
g. The Columbia JournalismReview, 211 et alia.
When numerous national media stories have raised similar credibility
issues, the academic community must necessarily address them as well.
The primary goal should be for the academic community to eliminate all
direct and indirect financial links to pro-gambling interests or other special
interests. Some academics/experts who attempted to maintain a degree of
contact with the pro-gambling interests during the 1990s via the
grant/research process eventually felt that they had to distance themselves
from those gambling interests presumably to maintain their own ethical
standards.21 2
3.

Recommendation: EncourageMore Public Scrutiny

The millions of dollars which pro-gambling interests have utilized to
promote or impact research may return to haunt the industry and associated

205.
206.

See, e.g., Research Financed by Industry, supra note 85, at A 17-18.
See, e.g., Gambling Seeks Image, supra note 83, at Al.
207.
Several articles in the Los ANGELES TIMES ran each day beginning the week of
December 13, 1998. See, e.g., Casino Backlash, supra note 74, at AI; Treatment Options,

supra note 63, at Al. See also David Ferrell, Indians Have Found a Bonanza in the Casino
Business, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1998, at A26; David Ferrell, Living by Casinos, Losing by
Casinos, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1998, at A26; Matea Gold, New Gamblers Find Old
Troubles, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1998, at A27; Matea Gold & David Ferrell, Going for
Broke, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1998, at Al.
208.
See, e.g., Young, supra note 85, at A9.
209.
See, e.g., Brett Pulley, Regulators Find Easy Path to Gambling Industry Jobs,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1998, at Al.
210.
See, e.g., April Lynch, All Bets Are Off, MOTHER JONES, July/Aug. 1997, at
38-39 [hereinafter Bets]; April Lynch, Heavy Betting, MOTHER JONES, July/Aug. 1997,
at 40.
211.
See, e.g., COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., supra note 1, at 36-38.
212.
See generally Casino Backlash, supra note 74, at Al.
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research interests. The national media and academia have indicated that
the following groups may face particular scrutiny:
a. The National Center for Responsible Gaming (NCRG) founded
in 1996 by the American Gaming Association,2 3
b. The Journal of Gambling Studies after pro-gambling interests
began significant funding circa 1990 (formerly the Journal of
c.
d.
e.

Gambling Behavior),2 14

The Gaming Law Review founded in 1997 but which has no
university affiliation, 1 5
The National Council on Problem Gambling (NCPG),21 6 and
The UNLV Boyd Law School, 217 founded in 1996-97.

213.
See, e.g., Casino Backlash, supra note 74, at Al. See supra notes 205-11 and
accompanying text. In establishing the National Center for Responsible Gaming, Frank
Fahrenkopf, the CEO of the American Gaming Association lobbying group admitted that
"industry-financed studies .... have not found credibility with the public." Rick Aim, KC
Will Be Home to Foundation for Gambling Studies, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 17, 1995, at B 1.
"We do not want to make the mistakes the tobacco industry made, saying, 'Smoking is good
for you,"' Fahrenkopf said. Associated Press, Industry to Study Problem Gambler, DES
MOINES REG., Feb. 19, 1996, at Al. According to Tom Irwin, the director of the Missouri
Gaming Commission, "You have to decide how much of this is altruism and how much is
self-preservation, ... At least what I've heard so far, they seem to be trying to honestly deal
with the problem." Id. However, Irwin concluded: "We look at all of this with a fairly
jaundiced eye." Id. See generally, Center of Controversy, supra note 90, at 4.
214.
See supra notes 205-11, 213 and accompanying text; Treatment Options, supra
note 63, at Al. See also Transcripts of symposium "Betting on the Future: Taking Gaming
and the Law into the 21st Century," Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School, Yeshiva Univ., New
York, New York, Nov. 15-16, 1999 [hereinafter Cardozo Law School Symposium].
215.
See supra notes 205-Il and accompanying text.
216.
See, e.g., Treatment Options, supra note 63, at Al. See supra notes 205-11 and
accompanying text. Like a censorship of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), one
example of the NCPG seriously challenging normal academic discourse occurred during the
NCPG's 10th Annual Conference from September 3-5, 1996. The sponsors of the NCPG
assigned the display booth of the Illinois Church Action on Alcohol Problems (ILLCAAP)
behind a conference hall door which was then allegedly locked to discourage visitors and on
which was placed a disclaimer by the NCPG leadership stating its disagreement with
ILLCAAP's brochures. For a discussion of the objections these apparent actions caused,
see Letter from Anita Bedell, Executive Director, ILLCAAP, Springfield, Ill., to
Leadershipl0th Annual Conference Sponsors, NCPG, Sept. 12, 1996 (public letter, on file
with Anita Bedell); Letter to Anita Bedell, Executive Director, ILLCAAP, Springfield, Ill.,
from Representative of 10th Annual Conference Sponsors/ NCPG, Sept. 16, 1996 (public
letter on file with Anita Bedell) (the disclaimer involved "a heated discussion among board
members from the National Council on Problem Gambling").
217.
Gambling Seeks Image, supra note 83; John L. Smith, Professor Sees Gainers
and Hookers and Lawyers, Oh My, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Nov. 2, 1997, at 18 [hereinafter
Professor Sees Gainers]; Illinois Prof. Takes Swing at UNLV's Law-School Bid, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., May 9, 1999 [hereinafter Swing at UNLV's Law-School Bid]. See also
Cardozo Law School Symposium, supra note 214.
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The 2001 President of the NCRG,2" 8 whose associated company
pledged $875,000 to the NCRG, also provided the primary contribution of
$5 million to establish the UNLV Boyd Law School.2 19
Critics argued that the financial aura of pro-gambling interests could
have the effect of tainting the research process. In reviewing the NCRG,
the news media made some comparisons to the tobacco industry:
Some critics see an analogy with cigarette manufacturers,
which for decades financed medical studies on tobaccoand were later found to have suppressed evidence that
cigarettes were harmful.
"It's the Tobacco Institute of gambling," grumbled
Bernie Horn [the former] legislative director for the
National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling inWashington. "The Tobacco Institute used to fund all these
studies about how smoking is good for you," Horn said,
contending that the gambling industry is essentially doing
the same thing.220
While there may not always be full disclosure of the degree of
involvement or influence exercised by the AGA lobbying group and its
associates in various organizations, many academics, experts, and
government decisionmakers will need to explore these issues and then
decide whether to embrace or divorce themselves from suspect groups.
When AGA representatives and lobbyists blatantly seek visibility in some
groups, afortiori the nonvisible influences of the AGA's philosophies
become more problematic to decisionmakers. Upon being made aware of
the apparent direct and indirect conflicts of interest outlined in the MegaLawsuits article, academics/experts should divorce themselves from the
gambling industry's umbra and rejoin mainstream academia.22'

218.

NAT'L

CTR.

FOR

RESPONSIBLE

GAMING,

ANNUAL

REPORT 2001,

at

3-4

[hereinafter NCRG 2001 ANNUAL REPORT].
219.
Id. at 4. Of the $7 million endowment for the UNLV Boyd Law School,
"$5 million came from Boyd, a Las Vegas lawyer who owns 10 casinos across the country,
including two in Las Vegas." Gambling Seeks Image, supra note 83 at Al.

220.
221.

Gambling Seeks Image, supra note 83, at Al.
Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 61, at 17.
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4. Recommendation: Focus on the Relevant Issues: Are Pro-Gambling
Interests Obfuscating the Obvious?
The personalized defense of pro-gambling interests speaks for itselfres ipsa loquitur. However, researchers should note the paucity of
footnotes (e.g., a couple dozen) in most studies by pro-gambling interestswhich also frequently cite to other industry-financed studies and materials.
By comparison, the Mega-Lawsuits article sometimes222 criticized by
pro-gambling consultants has 372 footnotes plus 15 tables.
As indicated in such academic publications as the Harvard Law
Review, 223 the types of criticisms promulgated by the gambling industry
parallel the types of tactics and responses utilized by some defenders of the
tobacco industry.224 A 1999 article in the HarvardLaw Review complained
that "[tiobacco manufacturers tried to portray scientists who reached
conclusions about the adverse effects of smoking as zealots who would do
anything, including conducting flawed science, to put the industry out of
business. 2 2 5 Unfortunately, it is in this context that analyses must be
made. Still, it is essential to examine those gambling issues impacting U.S.
military personnel and concomitant military readiness and not allow
representatives of the U.S. gambling industry to obfuscate the obvious.
5. Recommendation: Follow Frank Fahrenkopf the Washington
Lobbyistfor the American Gaming Association: All in the Family?
In 1995, Frank Fahrenkopf helped found and then became the CEO of
the Washington-based lobbying group, the American Gaming Association
(AGA), which had a budget of over $4 million per year.226 He also became
a Board Member of the National Center for Responsible Gaming (NCRG)
formed by the AGA in 1996227 with a multi-million-dollar budget provided
almost exclusively by the gambling industry.228 He also served on the
editorial board of the "self-styled Gaming Law Review-whose name is
misleading since it has no university sponsor., 229 "Founded in 1997 and

222.
223.

Id.
John D. Hason & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some
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publishing many pro-industry articles, the Gaming Review is vulnerable to
being labeled as primarily a gambling industry publication.,, 210 "With a
few exceptions, the editorial board for the Gaming Review consists of
gambling industry consultants, columnists for industry magazines, and
lobbyists."23'
In the first volume of the Gaming Review, editorial board member
Keith S. Whyte first utilized the "American Gaming Association" as his
organizational identifier, but thereafter he became head of the National
Council on Problem Gambling and was subsequently identified with the
NCPG.232 William Eadington has been listed on the editorial board of the
Gaming Review since its first issues even though he appears to have no
"legal" background or degrees.2 33 By 1999 the two main editors of the
Gaming Review were both associated with or made money from the
gambling industry.2 34

The 2001 Annual Report of the NCRG indicated that almost all of the
NCRG's multi-million dollar budget was provided by gambling companies
and pro-gambling interests.235 The two chief editors of the Journal of
Gambling Studies, William Eadington and Howard Shaffer, were also
associated with the NCRG. The NCRG's Annual Report indicated that the
NCRG contracted to establish the Institute for Research on Pathological
Gambling and Related Disorders 236 which the press reported as a de facto
move of the NCRG from Kansas City to the Harvard Division on
Addictions with Howard Shaffer. 7 Mr. Eadington was listed as a member
of the Institute's Program Advisory Board "whose role is to counsel the
Institute on all aspects of its program,, 238 and Shaffer
was listed as
240
"Staff, 239 as well as on the "NCRG Board of Directors.,
To avoid these types of observations, which could become issues in
future scenarios, all academics/experts should be alert to these
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considerations and should completely divest themselves of these and
similar associations.24'
VII. CONCLUSION

A.
REINSTITUTE THE BAN ON ELECTRONIC/VIDEO GAMBLING DEVICES ON
U.S. BASES AND FACILITIES

The U.S. Armed Forces should reinstitute the historical ban on
electronic/video gambling devices and slot machines due to the costs of
training military personnel, related suicides, and the costs of reducing
"military readiness"-as thousands of new personnel become addicted or
problem gamblers. In the Twenty-First Century's Age of Terrorism, the
$127 million in recreational funds generated by the machines were
miniscule compared to the larger policy issues involving "military
readiness." Furthermore, the Department of Defense should be wary of
competing budget interests; namely, U.S. gambling lobbyists who could
finesse a $40 billion tax write-off for electronic gambling devices justified
as an economic stimulus to counter the economic consequences of the 9/11
terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.
B.
ACADEMICS/EXPERTS SHOULD COMPLETELY DIVORCE THEMSELVES
FROM THE DIRECT AND/OR INDIRECT FINANCIAL AURA OF PRO-GAMBLING
INTERESTS

When multiple sources in the national media begin raising similar
questions of potential financial conflicts of interest in several research
areas, then members of the academic community should take note and
divorce themselves from those apparent financial conflicts. Accordingly,
some academics, including several at the University of Illinois, decline to
accept any honoraria, consultant fees, or research grants from pro-gambling
interests or other special interests. By adopting a similar policy, the
concerns voiced in the national media, including the Chronicle of Higher
Education,242 could be quieted.
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